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What are the sovereign rights of nations in an interdependent world, and to what extent do these
rights stand in the way of achieving important international objectives? These two questions rest at
the heart of contemporary debate over the role and design of international institutions as well as
growing tension between globalization and the preservation of national sovereignty. In this paper,
we propose answers to these two questions. We do so by first developing formal definitions of
national sovereignty that capture features of sovereignty emphasized in the political science
literature. We then utilize these definitions to describe the degree and nature of national sovereignty
possessed by governments in a benchmark (Nash) world in which there exist no international
agreements of any kind. And with national sovereignty characterized in this benchmark world, we
then evaluate the extent to which national sovereignty is compromised by international agreements
with specific design features. In this way, we delineate the degree of tension between national
sovereignty and international objectives and describe how that tension can be minimized  n and in
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“Of all the rights possessed by a nation, that of sovereignty is doubtless the most important.”  Emmerich de Vattel in The
Law of Nations, as quoted in Jeremy Rabkin, Why Sovereignty Matters, p. 27.
I. Introduction
What are the sovereign rights of nations in an interdependent world, and to what extent do
these rights stand in the way of achieving important international objectives?  These two questions
rest at the heart of contemporary debate over the role and design of international institutions as well
as growing tension between globalization and the preservation of national sovereignty.  But answers
are elusive.  This is attributable in part to the fact that national sovereignty is a complex notion,
reflecting a number of different features.  And it is attributable as well to the fact that nations interact
in increasingly complex and interdependent ways, making it difficult to draw clear distinctions
between international and domestic affairs.  
In this paper, we propose answers to these two questions.  We do so by first developing
formal definitions of national sovereignty that capture features of sovereignty emphasized in the
political science literature.  We then utilize these definitions to describe the degree and nature of
national sovereignty possessed by governments in a benchmark (Nash) world in which there exist
no international agreements of any kind.  And with national sovereignty characterized in this
benchmark world, we then evaluate the extent to which national sovereignty is compromised by
international agreements with specific design features.  In this way, we delineate the degree of
tension between national sovereignty and international objectives and describe how that tension can
be minimized – and in principle at times even eliminated – through careful institutional design.
We focus our formal analysis on two prominent features of national sovereignty: the ability
of governments to exercise unilateral control over their policy instruments and the issues that are
important to them, and to operate without outside influence in their internal affairs.  The first feature
reflects the extent to which a government can dictate the outcomes over the things it cares about,
and the second feature reflects the extent that a government is free to determine its own affairs when
other governments are indifferent to its choices.  Adopting a taxonomy described by Krasner (2001),
we associate interdependence sovereignty with the first feature and Westphalian sovereignty with2
the second.  With our formal definitions of interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian
sovereignty in hand, we then turn to a characterization of the nature and degree of sovereignty that
governments possess in various economic environments and institutional settings.
We begin this characterization by describing a two-country two-good general equilibrium
trading environment in which each government makes choices over its import tariff and a set of
domestic regulations.  In this trading environment, the interdependence across countries is pecuniary
in nature.  To identify the degree of sovereignty that governments possess in this environment in the
absence of an international agreement, we show that each government’s policy choices in the Nash
equilibrium can be partitioned into a choice of market access – the volume of imports it would
accept at a particular foreign exporter (world) price – given the other government’s policies, and then
a choice of how best to use its policy instruments to achieve its objectives while delivering this level
of market access (e.g., high tariffs and stringent domestic regulations or low tariffs and lax domestic
regulations).  This partition is useful, because it enables us to establish that governments typically
possess neither interdependence sovereignty nor Westphalian sovereignty in their market access
choices in the absence of international agreements,  but that they enjoy both interdependence and
Westphalian sovereignty in all other choices in this environment.  Moreover, we show that this
partition identifies the maximal sovereign choice set over all possible partitions of the government’s
policy choices.  This in turn establishes a benchmark set of sovereign choices in the absence of
international agreements – the mapping from market access levels to a government’s policy choices
for delivering those market access levels – from which we evaluate the impact that international
agreements may have on national sovereignty in this environment.
We consider first an international trade agreement that specifies for each government the
negotiated level of its tariff and possibly also a subset of its regulations.  Such an agreement is
natural to consider in this environment, because as we indicate the Nash policy choices of the two
governments are inefficient from an international perspective, and so with such an agreement the
governments can potentially correct this inefficiency and thereby both enjoy higher welfare.  While
an agreement of this form directly compromises national sovereignty over the policy instruments that3
are directly negotiated, we argue that it may also indirectly compromise national sovereignty over
the policy instruments that remain under unilateral control.  In fact, our first main result is to show
that any international trade agreement that moves a government away from its unilateral best-
response policies by specifying permissible levels for a subset of that government’s policies must
compromise that government’s sovereignty over at least as many instruments as it preserves.  This
result suggests a stark tradeoff between international efficiency – the attainment of which in general
requires an international trade agreement in this environment – and national sovereignty.
We show, however, that this tradeoff is not inevitable.  In particular, our second main result
is that an international trade agreement that takes the form of a market access agreement, under
which each government agrees to provide a specified level of market access to its trading partner but
is otherwise free to choose its policies as it sees fit, can achieve international efficiency without
compromising national sovereignty.  In effect, a market access agreement has the domestic and
foreign governments making joint determinations over the things for which they each lacked
sovereignty in the Nash equilibrium, but each government makes unilateral choices over the things
for which it enjoyed sovereignty in the Nash equilibrium.  As the international inefficiency in this
environment amounts to insufficient market access, a market access agreement can in this way
correct the international inefficiency without compromising national sovereignty.  
We next extend the two-country trade model to a three-country setting.  In particular, we
introduce a second foreign country, so that the domestic country now has two trading partners.  In
this environment, the interdependence across countries is still pecuniary in nature, but there is now
the possibility that the domestic country might set discriminatory tariffs against each of its trading
partners.  This allows us to consider the implications for national sovereignty of an international
agreement to abide by a non-discrimination rule, such as the MFN requirement to which
GATT/WTO members must submit when they join.  We ask: Is the domestic government’s
sovereignty  compromised if it agrees to abide by a non-discrimination rule?  Broadly speaking, we
may think of the answer to this question as indicating whether a government’s national sovereignty
would be compromised if it joined the GATT/WTO but made no market access commitments, and4
therefore simply agreed to abide by the MFN requirement of the GATT/WTO.  
Our third main result is that abiding by the non-discrimination rule involves no compromise
of national sovereignty.  Intuitively, the MFN requirement is inconsistent with certain market access
choices that would be feasible under discriminatory tariffs.  But market access choices lack
interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty even absent any international agreement,
so the restriction on these choices implied by MFN does not compromise national sovereignty.  And
given MFN-consistent market access choices, the MFN requirement has no bearing on the remaining
choices of a government, which are its sovereign choices, because the restriction to MFN tariffs does
not affect the feasible set for these choices. 
Thus far we have maintained the assumption that each country is “large” in world markets,
so that its policy choices affect foreign exporter (world) prices.  Characterizing the sovereignty of
“small” countries  – who by definition cannot alter world prices when they alter their policies – is
of some interest in its own right.  As we show, small countries differ from large countries in two
ways.  On the one hand, small countries suffer from an extreme lack of interdependence sovereignty
in their (Nash) market access choices, in that the foreign exporter prices they face are completely
determined by outside forces beyond their unilateral control.  On the other hand, small countries
enjoy Westphalian sovereignty in their (Nash) market access choices: a small country’s market
access choices are a matter of indifference to its trading partners, because these choices have no
bearing on foreign exporter prices. 
When we extend the three-country model to allow for the possibility that some countries are
small, we find that a direct tradeoff between international efficiency and national sovereignty now
arises, unless non-discriminatory policies are adopted.  In effect, if small countries are asked to make
market access commitments, their Westphalian sovereignty will be compromised.  If this is to be
avoided, then small countries must be left unconstrained to choose their best-response policies in any
international agreement.  This requirement, though, is consistent with international efficiency only
when tariffs also conform to the MFN requirement (which itself involves no compromise of national5
sovereignty).  As a consequence, we find that a non-discrimination rule can allow governments to
sidestep the efficiency/sovereignty tradeoff that would otherwise exist in this extended setting, and
we suggest that the MFN requirement is therefore “complementary” to preserving small-country
sovereignty in the following sense: the (Westphalian) sovereignty of small countries can be
preserved under an internationally efficient agreement only if that agreement abides by the MFN
requirement.  More broadly, our three-country results therefore suggest that a non-discrimination rule
coupled with a market access agreement can facilitate the attainment of internationally efficient
outcomes which do not compromise national efficiency. 
When viewed together, these results have potentially important implications for the design
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).  The GATT/WTO has from its inception been concerned most fundamentally with
non-discriminatory market access commitments, and it has traditionally sought to anchor these
commitments with negotiations over border measures (e.g., tariffs) that are “multilateralized”
through the MFN requirement.  But this tradition is being eroded on two fronts.  First, the extent and
importance of discriminatory trade agreements (permitted by GATT/WTO exceptions to its MFN
requirement) has increased dramatically in recent decades.  And second, increasingly the WTO is
thought of as a potential forum for the negotiation of international commitments on a host of non-
border policies that are deemed to have important market access consequences, ranging from labor
standards to environmental regulations to competition policy.  Our results highlight the fundamental
implications of these developments for the potential conflicts between international efficiency and
national sovereignty within the WTO.  Specifically, as our results indicate, the further the WTO
departs from facilitating agreements that take the form of non-discriminatory market access
commitments, the more it is likely to pose a (direct and indirect – and in principle, unnecessary)
threat to the sovereignty of its member governments.  
Finally, we extend our analysis from the case where the interdependence across countries is
of a pecuniary nature to discuss briefly the case where interdependence takes a non-pecuniary form.     
1The seminal contribution on fiscal federalism is Oates (1972).  More recent related contributions in an international
context include Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2003).
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This case is the focus of the large literature on fiscal federalism.
1  An important distinction that arises
here is that pecuniary externalities give rise to inefficiency only if agents (in this case governments)
wield market power and can therefore affect prices (in this case world prices) with their actions,
while with non-pecuniary externalities inefficiency typically arises even when each agent is small
and there is no market power affecting decisions.  As we argue, this distinction creates the possibility
of an unavoidable tradeoff between international efficiency and (Westphalian) sovereignty in the
presence of international non-pecuniary interdependence when some countries are small that, as we
have described above, is not present in the case of international pecuniary interdependence.  This is
because even small countries may have to make commitments regarding an international non-
pecuniary externality in order for the world to attain international efficiency, and these countries then
sacrifice their (Westphalian) sovereignty as a consequence.  
On the basis of this final observation we argue that, when it comes to issues of national
sovereignty as they arise in the context of efforts to address international “problems,” not all
international problems are alike.  In particular, international problems that are fundamentally
associated with trade have a particular structure – they concern international pecuniary externalities
– which implies the absence of any inherent conflict between international efficiency and national
sovereignty.  By contrast, confronting international problems that derive from international non-
pecuniary externalities is likely to pose a more direct efficiency/sovereignty tradeoff.  
This paper builds on our earlier work.  The basic two-country model with which we begin
in section II is developed in Bagwell and Staiger (2001).  The three-country model developed in
section V extends the three-country model of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) to incorporate domestic
regulatory policies.  In the present paper, however, we build from these models to provide a first
formal and systematic analysis of the implications of trade agreements for national sovereignty.  This
requires introducing formal definitions of sovereignty, and applying these definitions to evaluate the
degree and nature of sovereignty possessed by governments in a variety of economic environments7
and institutional settings, an exploration that no earlier work (neither ours, nor that of others) has
attempted.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II describes the basic two-country model
and characterizes the Nash and efficient policies.  Section III develops our formal definitions of
sovereignty, and characterizes the nature and degree of sovereignty in the Nash equilibrium.  Section
IV considers how national sovereignty is affected under international trade agreements that adopt
alternative designs.  Section V extends the modeling environment to a three-country setting, and
considers the implications of a non-discrimination rule and of the existence of small countries for
our sovereignty results.  Section VI discusses briefly the case of international non-pecuniary
interdependence.  Section VII concludes, while an Appendix contains more technical proofs.
II.  Tariffs and Regulations in a Two-Country Trade Model
Our starting point is the two-country two-good competitive general equilibrium model
adapted to allow for the possibility of both tariff and domestic regulatory policy choices as developed
in Bagwell and Staiger (2001).  We sketch briefly the essentials of that model here. 
II.1:  The Basic Two-Country Trade Model
The home country exports good y to the foreign country in exchange for imports of good x.
The local relative price of good x to good y in the home (foreign) country is denoted by     ( ),
where here and throughout “*” is used to denote foreign variables.  The “world price” (i.e., relative
exporter price or terms of trade ) is denoted by  , and international arbitrage links each country’s
local price to the world price in light of its tariff according to   and
, where      ( ) is one plus the ad valorem import tariff of the home
(foreign) country.  In addition to its tariff, each country also imposes a vector of local regulations, 
(with length  ) for the home country and   (with length  ) for the foreign country, that may
impact local production and/or consumption decisions at given prices.  Each country’s vector of local
regulations therefore acts as a vector of “shift” parameters in its import demand and export supply8
functions, and we assume that these functions are differentiable in their respective regulation levels.
Incorporating each country’s vector of regulations into its import demand and export supply
functions, we denote these functions for the home country by   and  ,
respectively, and for the foreign country by   and  , respectively.  The
home and foreign budget constraints may then be written as 
(1) ,
(2) .
The equilibrium world price,  , is determined by the requirement of market clearing for
good x, 
(3) ,
where we have made explicit the dependence of the local prices on the tariffs and the world prices,
and market clearing for good y is then implied by (1), (2) and (3).  We assume that the Metzler and
Lerner Paradoxes are ruled out, so that   and  .
Finally, we represent the objectives of the home and foreign governments with the general
functions   and  , respectively.  These objective functions reflect an
important assumption: governments care about the regulatory (and tariff) choices of their trading
partners only because of the trade impacts of these choices (and therefore only because of the
impacts of these choices on the equilibrium world price  ).  As a consequence, the interdependence
across countries is contained entirely in the determination of  , which is the only magnitude that
enters both the domestic and the foreign objective function.  This feature reflects in turn a
simplifying assumption that we maintain for now, namely, that there are no international non-
pecuniary externalities.  In section VI, we relax this assumption and discuss briefly a setting in which
important transboundary non-pecuniary externalities may also exist. 9
We assume that, holding its regulations and its local price fixed, and provided that its
regulations and local price do not imply autarky, each government would prefer an improvement in
its terms of trade, 
(4)  for  , and   for   .
According to (4), governments like transfers of revenue from their trading partners.  Our central
analysis concerns the case in which trade takes place, and so (4) is relevant.  However, we will report
one important special case in which no trade takes place, and so we develop the analogue to (4) that
applies in that circumstance.  In the case of autarky, a change in the terms of trade holding its
regulations and local price fixed should be irrelevant to a government, since there is no trade volume
and continues to be no trade volume after the change, and so we assume as well that 
(4a)  for  , and   for   .
We leave government objectives otherwise unrestricted, and observe that these objectives are
consistent with a wide variety of models of government behavior (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999).
II.2: Nash Policies
In a world without international agreements, we assume that the Nash Policy Game
characterizes the equilibrium policy choices of each government.  In the Nash Policy Game, each
government sets its trade and domestic regulatory policies simultaneously to maximize its objective
function taking as given the policy choices of its trading partner.  More specifically, the home
government chooses its best-response policies by solving  
Program 1:
taking   and   as given, at the same time that the foreign government chooses its best-response
policies by solving
Program 1*: 
taking   and   as given.10
At an interior solution, the resulting Nash equilibrium choices are defined by the first-order
conditions: 
(5)  for  ,
(6) ,
(7)  for  , and
(8)
where, with the Metzler and Lerner paradoxes ruled out,
.
The home government reaction curves are defined by (5) and (6), while the foreign government
reaction curves are defined by (7) and (8), with the Nash equilibrium policy choices defined by the
joint solutions to these equations.
II.3: Efficient Policies
We next characterize efficient policy choices.  Any efficient combination of policies will
achieve the maximal level of welfare for the home government given any fixed level of welfare for
the foreign government. The set of efficient policy combinations is defined as the set of solutions
to the first order conditions associated with this maximization problem, which with some
manipulation can be represented as:
(9)  for  ,
(10)  for  , and      
2Even here it can be argued that national sovereignty is preserved provided that the ultimate decision to leave the
agreement remains in the hands of a national government.  While acknowledging that such ambiguities exist in any
discussion of national sovereignty, we nevertheless abstract from a number of these to focus analytically on what we
believe are the most important features.
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(11) ,
where   and  . 
Here we simply observe that one efficient solution is what we have previously (Bagwell and
Staiger, 2001) called the politically optimal solution, defined by
(12)  for   ; and   for  .
III. National Sovereignty without International Agreements 
We are now ready to consider formally the issue of national sovereignty.  To begin, we need
to define what we mean by national sovereignty.  
III.1: Sovereignty Defined
An obvious feature of sovereignty is the possession of the sole decision-making authority in
determining one’s policies.  If the level of a policy instrument is directly negotiated between or
among governments, it seems reasonable to conclude that national sovereignty over that policy
instrument has been lost, at least as long as the agreement is in force.
2  A definition of sovereignty
should reflect this feature.  
But beyond this, it also seems that national sovereignty over a set of policy instruments might
be threatened indirectly even when direct authority over the setting of those policy instruments
remains in the hands of a national government.  This threat is emphasized by Rabkin (1998), who
observes:
“If sovereignty is defined as the ultimate authority to reject outside control, then all talk of threats to American12
sovereignty may appear quite absurd, especially while America remains the world’s only superpower.  But that is...an
extremely crude way of viewing the question of sovereignty.
“The real threat is not that the United States will be forced to act against the determined resolve of the American
political system.  Rather, the threat is that international commitments will distort or derange the normal workings of our
own system, leaving it less able to resolve policy disputes in ways acceptable to the American people.”  Rabkin (1998,
p. 34).
For example, as a result of an international agreement, a government might be compelled to
abide by a set of rules when setting its policies, even though the government may retain control over
its own policy choices within the limits dictated by these rules.  The MFN rule by which
governments agree to abide when they join the GATT/WTO is an example of this kind of restraint
in the context of the “unbound” tariff choices of a member government.  More subtle is the
possibility that international agreements over certain policies could have the effect of eroding the
sovereignty of national choices over other “domestic” policies.  The notion that GATT/WTO tariff
commitments may be fueling a “race to the bottom” in domestic regulatory policies reflects this kind
of possibility.
Moreover, even absent international agreements, a government may feel constrained by the
unilateral policy choices of other governments.  In this regard, a government might feel that the
choices it has available to it for imposing costly regulations on its export industries are constrained
by the unilateral policy choices of governments in other countries whose export industries compete
for world markets.  More generally, governments may consider it to be a loss of national sovereignty
when the “discipline” imposed by international markets constrains their options.  This point is often
made in the context of international capital flows, but the logic can be equally applied to
comparative-advantage based changes in the location of global production that occur even when
factors of production are themselves internationally immobile.  In effect, governments use policies
to induce outcomes over things they care about, and the policy choices of one government may
constrain the possible outcomes that another government’s policy choices can induce, even if there
is no international agreement between the two governments.
As this discussion indicates, defining sovereignty is not a simple task.  In fact, Krasner (2001)
identifies four distinct ways in which the term “sovereignty” has been commonly used in the13
international political science literature.  Krasner refers to these as domestic sovereignty,
international legal sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty.
Domestic sovereignty refers to the organization and effectiveness of political authority within the
state.  International legal sovereignty refers to the mutual recognition of states.  Interdependence
sovereignty refers to the scope of activities over which states can effectively exercise unilateral
control.  And Westphalian sovereignty reflects as its central premise the rule of nonintervention in
the internal affairs of other states.  
In principle, international agreements could have important implications for any of these four
notions of sovereignty.  Nevertheless, we will focus our analytical work on the implications of
international agreements for interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, as these
notions seem most closely related to the issues at the heart of our discussion above. 
To try to capture these features of national sovereignty, we propose the following definitions.
In essence, we associate with interdependence sovereignty the notion of unilateral control, and with
Westphalian sovereignty the notion of internal affairs:
Definition: A government exercises unilateral control in a choice problem provided that its payoff
in that choice problem is unaffected by the choices of other governments.  A government has
interdependence sovereignty in any choice problem within which it exercises unilateral control.
Definition: A government’s choice problem concerns its internal affairs provided that all other
governments are indifferent to the outcome of that choice problem.  A government has Westphalian
sovereignty in any choice problem that concerns its internal affairs.
Definition: A government has sovereignty in any choice problem for which it has both
interdependence and Westphalian sovereignty. 
Admittedly, while these definitions have the advantage of analytical clarity, they do not
capture the breadth of concerns that are embodied in the conventional usage of these notions of
sovereignty in the political science and legal literature.  This is perhaps particularly true of our     
3In this regard, Krasner (2001, p. 20) notes that the common terminology of “Westphalian sovereignty” actually
reflects a historical inaccuracy, since the  “...norm of nonintervention in internal affairs had virtually nothing to do with
the Peace of Westphalia...”.  
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definition of Westphalian sovereignty.  For example, as Krasner (2001) observes, Vattel was one of
the first writers to explicitly articulate the principle of nonintervention, from which the notion of
Westphalian sovereignty developed.
3  Vattel (1872, pp. 59-60) draws a distinction between “perfect
rights and obligations,” which are associated with “the right of compulsion,” and “imperfect rights
and obligations,” which are associated only with “the right to ask.”  Using this distinction, Vattel
associates a nation’s internal affairs with any choice that does not affect the perfect rights of any
other nation.  Moreover, Vattel (1872, pp. 226-227) asserts that the rights and obligations stemming
from trade with other nations are imperfect.  Accordingly, as long as they are voluntary (reflecting
only “the right to ask”), commercial treaties between nations would not ordinarily be viewed as
violating Westphalian sovereignty, unless these treaties impaired the perfect rights of some nation.
As this discussion suggests and as much of the legal and political science literature reflects,
violations of Westphalian sovereignty are commonly associated with coercion, which is not really
our concern here.  Nevertheless, Westphalian sovereignty can be compromised through invitation
(voluntary action) as well as intervention (coercion).  As Krasner (2001) notes:   
“...Rulers may issue invitations for a variety of reasons, including tying the hands of their successors, securing external
financial resources, and strengthening domestic support for values that they, themselves, embrace.  Invitations may
sometimes be inadvertent; rulers might not realize that entering into an agreement may alter their own domestic
institutional arrangements.  Regardless of the motivation or the perspicacity of rulers, invitations violate Westphalian
sovereignty by subjecting internal authority structures to external constraints...” Krasner (2001, p. 22). 
We may think of the notion of internal affairs offered above – from which we define Westphalian
sovereignty – as particularly useful for assessing when Westphalian sovereignty might be
compromised through invitation (e.g., through a voluntary international agreement).  That is, as we
discuss further below, if an international agreement impinges on the choices a government makes
even when those choices are a matter of indifference to foreign governments, i.e., its “internal
affairs,” then it seems natural to conclude that this government’s Westphalian sovereignty has been
compromised.  In this way, we believe that our definitions of (Westphalian and interdependence)
sovereignty, while not always consistent with the conventional usage of these terms, do capture key15
elements of the nature of sovereignty as it relates to concerns over international agreements.     
In the remainder of the paper, we will explore the nature of national sovereignty in various
international settings using the definitions above.  In each case, we evaluate the degree of sovereignty
according to a local criterion, by asking what degree of sovereignty is present for small policy
changes around an equilibrium.  
III.2: Sovereignty in the Absence of International Agreements 
With sovereignty defined, we next characterize the nature and degree of sovereignty
possessed by each government in the Nash Policy Game.  This provides an important benchmark,
because the impact of an international agreement on a nation’s sovereignty can only be assessed once
the nature and degree of sovereignty absent the agreement is understood.  The sovereignty possessed
by a government in the Nash Policy Game thus provides a natural baseline from which to gauge the
impact of any international agreement.  
Our approach is to propose a particular partition of a government’s best-response choice
problem into an equivalent problem in which two sub-problems are solved sequentially, and then
to show that the government enjoys sovereignty over the choices it faces in the first-step sub-
problem, but that it (generally) does not have sovereignty over the choices it faces in the second-step
sub-problem.  Our argument is then completed by establishing that the second-step choices that the
government faces in this particular partition are also necessary in any other partition that produces
sovereign choices in the associated first-step sub-problem. With this established, we may conclude
that our proposed partition identifies the maximal sovereign choice set for each government in the
Nash Policy Game.  As a consequence of this argument, we thus establish that a government’s
sovereign choices in the Nash Policy Game are the choices it makes in the first-step sub-problem of
our chosen partition.  
We develop this partition from the perspective of the domestic government (an analogous
development holds for the foreign government).  To this end, recall the best-response policy choice     
4Program 1' abuses notation slightly.  In the program,   is a number, which is constrained ultimately to correspond
to the   function defined by (3).
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problem of the domestic government, defined by Program 1 in the previous section.  Using the
market-clearing condition (3) that determines  , Program 1 (which takes   and   as given) can
be equivalently written as 
s.t. ,
which is in turn equivalent to 
s.t.
for any M.   
Consider now the partition of this program into the alternative two-step program:




where   and   are the solutions from Step 1 and   is the Step-1 Lagrangean.
4  For
future reference, we denote by   the Lagrangean associated with the Step-2 sub-problem. 
The two-step partition defined in Program 1' may be interpreted as follows.  Following
Bagwell and Staiger (2001), we define the level of market access as the volume of imports a country17
would accept at a particular world price.  Accordingly, the Step-1 choice problem in Program 1'
describes the domestic government’s choice of  tariff and regulatory policies among the feasible
domestic policy combinations defined by the domestic market-access constraint for any given level
of domestic market access, i.e., among the feasible domestic policy combinations   defined by
 for any  .   The Step-2 choice problem in Program 1' then
describes  the domestic government’s choice of a particular domestic market access level among the
feasible domestic market access levels defined by the foreign export supply curve for any given level
of foreign policies and the requirement of market clearing, i.e., among the feasible domestic market
access levels   defined by the constraint   for any  .
To establish that Program 1 and Program 1' are equivalent ways of expressing the domestic
government’s best-response policy choice problem, we first record the first-order conditions that
define the solutions to the Step-1 and Step-2 sub-problems of Program 1'.  Using the Envelope
Theorem, and with   denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with   and   denoting the
Lagrange multiplier associated with  , the first-order conditions associated with the domestic
government’s Step-1 sub-program are
(13)  for   , and
(14) ,




We may now state:     
5Of course, different levels of   and   may lead to different choices of   and  , but the point is that these
choices are made by the domestic government in Step 2, and therefore   and   are taken as fixed in Step 1.
     
6That is, for given   and  , the foreign government is indifferent over combinations of   and   that deliver the
same   and hence    (by the requirement of market clearing given by  ), as
indicated by its implied welfare level  .
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Lemma 1: Program 1 and Program 1' are equivalent ways of characterizing the domestic
government’s best-response policies for any   and  .
Proof: See Appendix.
We prove Lemma 1 by establishing that the first-order conditions associated with Program 1', (13)-
(16), are equivalent to the first-order conditions associated with Program 1, (5)-(6).  
In light of Lemma 1, we next characterize the degree of sovereignty that the domestic
government enjoys in the Nash Policy Game when sovereignty is evaluated using the particular
partition of the domestic government’s best-response choice problem described by Program 1'.
While a completely analogous result to Lemma 1 may be stated for the foreign government, we
continue to focus on the domestic government, and begin with its Step-1 choices.
In Step 1 of Program 1', the levels of   and   are taken as fixed, because they are
determined by the domestic government in its Step-2 sub-problem.  Hence, the domestic government
exercises unilateral control in its Step 1 choice problem since, with   and   given, its payoff in
that choice problem is unaffected by the choices of the foreign government.
5  Accordingly, the
domestic government has interdependence sovereignty in its Step-1 choice problem.  Moreover, the
Step-1 choice problem of the domestic government concerns its internal affairs since, with    and 
determined in its Step-2 sub-problem, the foreign government is indifferent to the outcome of the
domestic government’s Step-1 choice problem.
6  Accordingly, we may conclude that the domestic
government has Westphalian sovereignty in its Step-1 choice problem as well. 
Exactly analogous observations hold for the foreign government’s Step-1 choice problem.     
7We consider how these statements must be modified to accommodate the possibility of “small” countries in section
V, where we develop a many country model.
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Let us denote by   and   the solutions from the foreign government’s analogous
Step-1 problem.  Finally, we denote by   the (length  ) vector of domestic policy
instruments chosen by the domestic government in its Step-1 problem, and similarly we denote by
 the (length  ) vector of foreign policy instruments chosen by the foreign
government in its Step-1 problem.  We may now state:
Proposition 1:  When evaluated using the partition described in Program 1', each government’s
choice of how best to use its policy instruments to achieve its objectives while delivering any level
of market access (i.e, the function   for the domestic government and the function
 for the foreign government) is sovereign in the Nash Policy Game.
Consider next the domestic government’s Step-2 choices.  The foreign government’s policy
choices influence the domestic government’s payoff in this choice problem through the constraint
in the domestic government’s Step-2 program.  As a consequence, the domestic government
exercises unilateral control in its Step-2 choice problem if and only if the multiplier on this
constraint,  , is zero.  In addition, the foreign government is indifferent to the outcome of the
domestic government’s Step-2 choice problem – and therefore this choice problem concerns the
domestic government’s internal affairs – if and only if the foreign government is indifferent to
changes in the world price (i.e.,  ).  In general, neither of these conditions will hold in our
two-country model, and so in general each government will enjoy neither interdependence
sovereignty nor Westphalian sovereignty in its Step-2 choice problem.
7  
As a general matter, then, Proposition 1 provides the full characterization of the degree of
sovereignty enjoyed by governments in the Nash Policy Game when evaluated using the partition
described in Program 1'.  However, there is one special case where governments do enjoy some
sovereignty in their Step-2 choices, and in this case it turns out that they enjoy both interdependence     
8Strictly speaking, this definition should be stated for a particular partition of the government choice problem, so that
the statement “all its choice problems” has an exact meaning.  However, as becomes clear from Proposition 2, if a
government has absolute sovereignty under any partition of its choices, then it has absolute sovereignty under every
partition of its choices, and so we prefer to keep the definition of absolute sovereignty provided in the text more informal.
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and Westphalian sovereignty in their Step-2 choices.  To describe this special case, we say that a
government has absolute sovereignty if it has sovereignty in all its choice problems.
8  In light of
Proposition 1, we may now characterize this case as follows:
Proposition 2: When evaluated using the partition described in Program 1', governments enjoy
absolute sovereignty in the Nash Policy Game if and only if the politically optimal choices of tariffs
and standards imply autarky.
Proof: To prove this proposition, we need only (in light of Proposition 1) establish that the Step-2
choice problem of each government is sovereign if and only if the politically optimal choices of
tariffs and standards imply autarky.  We consider the home government, and recall that sovereignty
in its Step-2 choice problem arises if and only if (i)  , and (ii)  .  Using (13)-(16), we may
derive the following three expressions for  :
(17a)  for  ;
(17b) ; and
(17c) .
By (17a)-(17c), (12) and (4a),   if and only if the politically optimal choices of tariffs and
standards imply autarky, which by (4a) implies as well that  .  An analogous argument applies
to the foreign government. QED
As politically optimal policy choices are efficient, an immediate implication of Proposition21
2 is the following:
Corollary: When evaluated using the partition described in Program 1', policy choices in the Nash
Policy Game are absolutely sovereign if and only if they are also efficient.
Hence, as Proposition 2 and its Corollary indicate, when evaluated using the partition described in
Program 1', absolute sovereignty is achievable in the absence of international agreements only when
(i) countries are in absolute isolation, and (ii) this isolation is internationally efficient, and so there
is no reason for the existence of international agreements. 
Together, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that, when evaluated using the partition described in
Program 1', the sovereign choices of each government in the Nash Policy Game (outside the
absolute-isolation benchmark) are described by the respective functions   and  .
In effect, in the Nash Policy Game each government maintains sovereignty over all choices other
than its market access choices: but governments enjoy neither Westphalian nor interdependence
sovereignty over their market access choices, despite the fact that there is no international agreement
in the Nash Policy Game.  Of course, this characterization of sovereignty depends upon the particular
(and potentially arbitrary) partition described in Program 1'.  However, we next suggest that this
partition provides a sensible basis from which to characterize sovereignty in the Nash Policy Game,
because the constraints imposed in Step 1 under this partition are a subset of the constraints imposed
in Step 1 under any other partition that yields sovereign Step-1 choices.  As a consequence, the
partition described in Program 1' may be said to identify the maximal sovereign choice set for each
government in the Nash Policy Game.      
More specifically, we now turn to the final step of our argument, and establish that the
second-step choices that the government faces in the partition defined in Program 1' are also
necessary in any other partition that produces sovereign choices in the associated first-step sub-
problem.  The only exception to this statement arises in the absolute-isolation benchmark case
identified in Proposition 2, where governments enjoy absolute sovereignty in the Nash Policy Game
when evaluated using the partition described in Program 1': in that case, any partition of the22
government’s best-response choice problem will yield the same characterization of sovereignty.  We
record this finding in:
Lemma 2: If a partition of the domestic (foreign) government’s best-response choice problem
contains a sub-problem within which the domestic (foreign) government’s choices are sovereign,
then the level of domestic (foreign) market access must be determined by domestic (foreign) choices
outside of this sub-problem, unless governments enjoy absolute sovereignty in the Nash Policy
Game.
Proof: Consider the domestic government.  Suppose that, under a certain partition of the
government’s best-response choice problem, there exists a sub-problem within which the domestic
government’s choices are sovereign.  If the level of domestic market access is not determined by the
domestic government’s choices outside of this sub-problem, then the level of domestic market access
must be determined (fixing the choices in all its other sub-problems) by the domestic government’s
choices in this sub-problem.  In this sub-problem, then, the domestic government must (i) make
choices which determine the market-clearing world price  , and (ii) face the constraint (possibly
among multiple constraints) on feasible domestic market access levels defined by the foreign export
supply curve and the requirement of market clearing, i.e.,  . But
unless governments enjoy absolute sovereignty in the Nash Policy Game, Westphalian sovereignty
is precluded by (i), while interdependence sovereignty is precluded by (ii), contradicting the original
supposition that the domestic government’s choices are sovereign in this sub-problem.  Therefore,
the level of domestic market access must be determined by choices outside of this sub-problem,
unless governments enjoy absolute sovereignty in the Nash Policy Game.  QED
According to Lemma 2, as long as attention is restricted to settings in which absolute
isolation is not efficient – a restriction we maintain from here on – then the partition of the domestic
government’s best-response policy choices described in Program 1' identifies the maximal sovereign
choice set over all possible partitions of the domestic government’s best-response policy choices:
as described by the unilateral choice function  , the choices that the domestic government
makes over its maximal sovereign choice set concern everything that it cares about except the level     
9Recalling now our discussion of sovereignty in section III.1, a link can be forged between the sovereign choice
functions defined by   and   and the notion of Westphalian sovereignty described in the passage quoted
from Krasner (2001).  We may think of alterations in these functions which arise as a result of international agreements
as analogous to alterations in the “domestic institutional arrangements” that these agreements might trigger.  The link
is not exact, however, as the functions   and   reflect choices that feature interdependence (as well as
Westphalian) sovereignty.  
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of market access it affords to the foreign country.  Lemma 2 implies that any other sovereign choice
set associated with any other partition of the government’s best-response policy choices must also
exclude market access (and if different from the maximal sovereign choice set described by Program
1', must exclude other choices as well).  With analogous observations for the foreign government,
we may therefore state: 
Proposition 3: The unilateral choice functions   and   describe, respectively, the
choices that the domestic and foreign government make over their maximal sovereign choice sets
in the Nash Policy Game.
Armed with Proposition 3, we now associate the domestic and foreign government’s
sovereign choices in the Nash Policy Game – henceforth their sovereign choices – with the
respective unilateral choice functions   and  .  In the following section, we use
these functions to evaluate the erosion of national sovereignty that may occur once governments
negotiate international agreements.
9 
IV. National Sovereignty and International Trade Agreements
In this section we explore the ways in which international trade agreements may erode
national sovereignty.  We have argued in the previous section that the sovereign choices of the
domestic and foreign governments absent any international agreement are represented by the
respective unilateral choice functions   and  .  Our central concern, then, is
whether an international trade agreement has the effect of “corrupting” (i.e., altering) these choice
functions with external influence.  This concern provides one way to formalize the threat described
by Rabkin (1998, p. 34) and quoted in section III.1 above, that “...international commitments will24
distort or derange the normal workings of our own system, leaving it less able to resolve policy
disputes in ways acceptable to the American people.” (see also note 9).
As discussed in section III.1, international agreements may encroach on national sovereignty
both directly and indirectly.  We say that the domestic (foreign) government’s sovereignty over a
policy instrument in      ( )  is directly compromised by an international agreement whenever
limits on this policy instrument are determined directly as a result of international negotiations.  We
say that a government’s sovereignty is indirectly compromised by an international agreement
whenever there exists a policy instrument for which the government’s sovereignty is not directly
compromised by the international agreement but for which the government’s unilateral choice differs
from its sovereign choice (i.e., differs from the corresponding element of   – for the domestic
government – or   – for the foreign government) evaluated at the level of market access
delivered under the agreement.  Finally, we say that a government’s sovereignty over a policy
instrument is  compromised  (preserved)  whenever its sovereignty is directly or indirectly  (neither
directly nor indirectly)  compromised.  
 
Consider first an international trade agreement that specifies the tariff levels to be applied
by each government and also possibly the regulatory levels for a subset of domestic regulations and
a subset of foreign regulations.  Let the domestic regulations that are not determined directly by the
international agreement be contained in the set  , and let the foreign regulations that are not
determined directly by the international agreement be contained in the set  .  If the international
trade agreement concerns only tariff levels, then the set   contains the entire vector of domestic
regulations   and the set   contains the entire vector of foreign regulations  .  Otherwise, these
sets contain only a subset of the elements of the respective regulatory vectors. 
At this point it proves convenient to introduce a notion of “interrelatedness” between
policies.  Taking the perspective of the domestic government, and recalling that   denotes the Step-1
Lagrangean for Program 1, we say that two policies u and v are interrelated if   when   is25
evaluated at the maximized Step-1 choices  .  In words, when u and v are interrelated, a
change in v alters the level of u preferred by the domestic government for delivering a given level
of market access.  An exactly analogous interpretation applies for the foreign government. 
We may now state:
Proposition 4: An international trade agreement that specifies levels for domestic and foreign tariffs
and a subset of domestic and foreign regulations must, for each government, compromise that
government’s sovereignty over at least as many policy instruments as it preserves, provided that: (i)
the agreement specifies at least one policy instrument for each government at a level different from
its best-response level; and (ii) all policies are interrelated. 
Proof: We adopt the perspective of the domestic government.  If   is empty, then it is immediate
that the statement of the proposition is satisfied, since in this case the sovereignty over all domestic
instruments is (directly) compromised. If instead   is non-empty, then the proposition is proved if
it can be established that, to preserve the sovereignty of   domestic policy instruments, at least 
domestic policy instruments must be directly negotiated (and therefore the domestic government’s
sovereignty over these instruments is directly compromised).  Let   be the vector of domestic
regulatory choices under the domestic government’s control, and let   be the domestic tariff level
and   be the vector of domestic regulations specified by the international trade agreement.  Given
any foreign policies   and  , the domestic government’s unilateral best-response choice of 
must solve the program: 
Program 2:
taking   and   as given. The first-order conditions for Program 2 are given by the analogue of
(5) for the domestic regulatory choices contained in  .  Now consider the partition of this program
into the alternative two-step program: 




where   is the solution from Step 1 and solves the first-order conditions analogous to (13)
for the domestic regulatory choices contained in  , and   is the Step-1 Lagrangean.  Arguments
identical to those in the proof of Lemma 1establish that Program 2 and Program 2' are equivalent
ways of characterizing the domestic government’s unilateral best-response choice of  .  Hence, to
complete the proof we need only observe that: (a) preserving the sovereignty of   domestic policy
instruments requires that, with market access fixed at the level delivered under the agreement, it must
be possible to satisfy the Step-1 first-order conditions when evaluated at the corresponding 
elements of  , with   itself evaluated at the level of market access delivered under the
agreement; and (b) with all policies interrelated, this in turn requires that there exist at least   policy
instruments that are directly negotiated and can be used to “target”   of these Step-1 first-order
conditions.  The only exception to this requirement occurs if the agreement fails to specify at least
one policy instrument for each government at a level different from its best-response level, an
exception that is ruled out by the conditions of the proposition.  An analogous argument applies to
the foreign government. QED
According to Proposition 4, any international trade agreement that moves a government away
from its unilateral best-response policies by specifying permissible levels for a subset of that
government’s policies must compromise that government’s sovereignty over at least as many
instruments as it preserves, provided only that its policies are interrelated.  This seems to suggest a
basic tradeoff that governments must typically confront between international efficiency – which in
general cannot be achieved in the absence of an international trade agreement that moves
governments away from their unilateral best-response policies – and national sovereignty.  However,
the existence of this tradeoff is not inevitable.  As we next show, an international agreement can be
designed in such a way as to avoid the need to sacrifice national sovereignty in pursuit of
international efficiency.27
To establish this, we will say that a government’s sovereignty is preserved by an international
agreement if its sovereignty over every policy instrument is preserved (i.e., is neither directly nor
indirectly compromised).  Consider, then, the following market access agreement.  Under a market
access agreement, the domestic government agrees to abide by a specified domestic market access
constraint defined by a level of domestic import volume   and world price level  ,
, but the domestic government is otherwise free to choose its tariff   and
domestic regulations  .  Similarly, the foreign government agrees to  abide by a specified foreign
market access constraint defined by a level of foreign import volume   and world price level  ,
, but the foreign government is otherwise free to choose its tariff   and
foreign regulations  .  Notice that a market access agreement has the domestic and foreign
governments making joint determinations over the magnitudes for which, according to Proposition
3, they each lack sovereignty in the Nash Policy Game (namely, the Step-2 choices of each
government), but each government continues to make unilateral choices in a market access
agreement over the magnitudes for which it enjoys sovereignty in the Nash Policy Game according
to Proposition 3 (namely, the Step-1 choices of each government as embodied in   and
 ).  
We may now state:
Proposition 5: Market access agreements preserve the sovereignty of each government.
Proof: The proof is immediate, since (i) neither government’s sovereignty is directly compromised,
and (ii) given its domestic market access constraint the domestic government then chooses  ,
while given its foreign market access constraint the foreign government then chooses  ,
and so neither government’s sovereignty is indirectly compromised. QED
We have established in Bagwell and Staiger (2001, Proposition 1) that the nature of the
international inefficiency in the Nash equilibrium of this model is an insufficient level of market     
10The other important non-discrimination rule in the GATT/WTO is that of “national treatment,” which applies to
non-border measures.  In our formal model, the MFN rule would apply to tariffs, while the national treatment rule would
apply to regulations.  We focus here on the implications of the MFN rule for national sovereignty, but analogous findings
could be formalized with regard to national treatment. 
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access, and it is therefore direct that a market access agreement can achieve international efficiency
by expanding market access to an efficient level.  As a consequence, we may also state the following:
Corollary: Market access agreements involve no tradeoff between international efficiency and
national sovereignty.
V. National Sovereignty and Non-discrimination
We now extend the two-country model with standards to a three-country setting.  In
particular, we introduce a second foreign country, so that the domestic country now has two trading
partners.  This creates the possibility that the domestic country might set discriminatory tariffs
against each of its trading partners, and allows us to consider the implications for national
sovereignty of an international agreement to abide by a non-discrimination rule, such as the MFN
rule to which governments must adhere when they join the GATT/WTO.
10  The three-country model
is based on the multi-country model in Bagwell and Staiger (1999), adapted to allow for the
possibility of both tariff and domestic standards choices.     
V.1:  The Three-Country Trade Model
The home country exports good y to foreign countries 1 and 2 in exchange for imports of
good x from each of them.  For simplicity, we do not allow trade between the two foreign countries,
and so only the home country has the opportunity to set discriminatory tariffs across its trading
partners.  The local relative price of good x to good y in the home country (foreign country j) is
denoted by     ( , j=1,2).  The “world price” (i.e., relative exporter price) for trade between the
home country and foreign country j is denoted by  , and international arbitrage links each
country’s local price to the relevant world price in light of its tariff according to  ,
and   for  j=1,2, where      ( ) is one plus the ad valorem import tariff
that the home country (foreign country j) applies to the imports from foreign country j (the home29
country).  This implies in turn that world prices are linked across bilateral relationships:
(18) .
We note in particular that an MFN rule requires   and therefore implies   by (18).
As in the two-country model above, in addition to its tariff, each country also imposes a vector of
local regulations,   (with length  ) for the home country and   (with length  ) for foreign
country j, that may impact local production and/or consumption decisions at given prices.  Each
country’s vector of local regulations will therefore act as a vector of “shift” parameters in its import
demand and export supply functions, and as before we assume that these functions are differentiable
in their respective regulation levels. 
Incorporating each country’s vector of regulations into its import demand and export supply
functions, we denote these functions for the home country by   and  , respectively,
and for foreign country j by   and  , respectively, where   is the
home-country’s multilateral terms of trade, and is defined by 
with
 for j=1,2.
The home and foreign budget constraints may then be written as 
(19) , and
(20)  for j=1,2.
The pair of equilibrium world prices,   for j=1,2, are then determined by
the linkage condition (18) together with the requirement of market clearing for good x, 30
(21) ,
with market clearing for good y then implied by (19) and (20).  As before, we assume that the
Metzler- and Lerner- Paradox type outcomes are ruled out, so that   and
 for j=1,2.
Finally, in analogy with our two-country model, we represent the objectives of the home and
foreign government j=1,2 with the general functions   and  , respectively.
As before, we assume that, holding its regulations and its local price fixed, and provided that its
regulations and local price do not imply autarky, each government would prefer an improvement in
its terms of trade, 
(22)  for  , and   for  .
We leave government objectives otherwise unrestricted.  
V.2: Nash Policies
In a three-country world without international agreements, we assume that the Multilateral
Nash Policy Game characterizes the equilibrium policy choices of each government.  In the
Multilateral Nash Policy Game, each government sets its trade and domestic regulatory policies
simultaneously to maximize its objective function taking as given the policy choices of all other
governments.  More specifically, the home government chooses its best-response policies by solving
Program 3:
taking   and    for j=1,2 as given, at the same time that foreign government j , for j=1,2, chooses
its best-response policies by solving
Program  : 
taking as given  ,   and   and   for k=1,2 and  .31
At an interior solution, the resulting Nash equilibrium choices are defined by the first-order
conditions: 
(23)  for  ,
(24) , for  ,
(25)  for  ,   and
(26)  for  ,
where, with the Metzler and Lerner paradoxes ruled out,
.
We observe that, by the linkage condition (18),  , and so (23) may be
equivalently evaluated for either j=1,2.  The home government reaction curves are defined by (23)
and (24), while foreign government j’s reaction curves are defined by (25) and (26), with the Nash
equilibrium policy choices defined by the joint solutions to these equations.
V.3: Efficient Policies
We characterize efficient policy choices in the Appendix (see the proof of Proposition 6).
Here we simply define the politically optimal tariffs and regulations:
(27)  for  ;   for   ; and   for  .
In the Appendix we prove:
Proposition 6: Politically optimal tariffs and regulations are efficient if and only if the tariffs
conform to MFN.  Moreover, if any country sets its politically optimal policies, then efficiency
requires that all countries set their politically optimal policies and abide by MFN.
Proof: See Appendix.32
V.4: Sovereignty in the Absence of International Agreements 
As with our two-country model, we next observe that the Nash policy choices defined by the
simultaneous solutions to Program 3 and Program   may be written in an equivalent form in which
each government’s program is partitioned into a two-step choice problem.  Following our two-
country presentation, we develop this partition from the perspective of the domestic government. 
To this end, recall the best-response policy choice problem of the domestic government
defined by Program 3.  In analogy with the two-country model, in which the best-response policy
choice problem contained in Program 1 was transformed into Program 1'  by first introducing 
as a choice variable and adding the market-clearing condition (3) as a constraint, we now transform
Program 3 by first introducing  ,   and   as choice variables and adding the appropriate
constraints.  The three new constraints are the linkage condition (18), the market-clearing condition
(21), and the definition of   in terms of the foreign regulatory choices and the foreign local and
world prices.  However, rather than introduce the linkage condition explicitly, it is convenient to
instead use this condition to eliminate   as an independent choice variable in the domestic
government’s best-response problem.  And rather than introduce explicitly the definition of  , it is
convenient instead to use this definition to eliminate   as an independent choice variable in the
domestic government’s best-response problem.  Utilizing (18) and the definition of   in this way,
and using   to denote  , Program 3 (which takes 
and    for j=1,2 as given) can be equivalently written as 
s.t. , 
which is in turn equivalent to 
s.t.33
for any  .  Observe that, taking   and   for j=1,2 as given,   is determined once   and 
are chosen.  
Consider now the partition of this program into the alternative two-step program:
Program 3': Step 1. Fix  , and 
s.t. .
Step 2.  
s.t. ,
where   and   are the solutions from Step 1 and   is the Step-1 Lagrangean.
For future reference, we denote by   the Lagrangean associated with the Step-2 sub-problem. 
Using the Envelope theorem, and with   denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
and   denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with  , the first-order conditions associated with
the domestic government’s Step-1 program are then
(28)  for   , and
(29) ,




We may now state:
Lemma 3: Program 3 and Program 3' are equivalent ways of characterizing the domestic
government’s best-response policies for any  ,  ,   and  .
Proof: See Appendix.
In exact analogy with our two-country model, we may by Lemma 3 utilize the two-step
representation of the domestic government’s best-response policies developed just above to
characterize the nature and degree of national sovereignty enjoyed by the domestic government in
the Multilateral Nash Policy Game.  As in the two-country setting, an examination of the domestic
government’s Step-1 choice problem indicates that it enjoys (both interdependence and Westphalian)
sovereignty over these choices.  Similarly, an examination of the domestic government’s Step-2
choice problem indicates that, except for the case of absolute isolation, the domestic government
enjoys neither interdependence sovereignty nor Westphalian sovereignty over these choices.  
Finally, it may be established as in the two-country setting that the partition embodied in
Program 3' identifies the maximal sovereign choice set over all partitions of the domestic
government’s best-response policy choices.  Denoting by   the (length  ) vector of
policy instruments chosen by the domestic government in its Step-1 problem (namely, 
and  ), we may thus conclude that, as described by the unilateral choice function
, the choices that the domestic government makes over its maximal sovereign choice
set concern everything that it cares about except the level of market access it affords to each of the
two foreign countries (as defined by  the volume of imports it would accept at a particular pair of
bilateral world prices).  Hence, as in the two-country setting, we associate in our three-country model
the domestic government’s sovereign choices with the domestic government’s unilateral choice
function  .  Observing that foreign countries 1 and 2 are exactly analogous to the foreign35
country in the two-country model, we may also denote the sovereign choice function of foreign
government j for j=1,2, by  .
V.5: Sovereignty and Non-discrimination
We may now ask the central question of this section: Is the domestic government’s
sovereignty compromised if it agrees to abide by a non-discrimination rule?  Broadly speaking, we
may think of the answer to this question as indicating whether a government’s national sovereignty
would be compromised if it joined the GATT/WTO but made no market access commitments, and
therefore simply agreed to abide by the MFN principle of the GATT/WTO.  We answer this question
in two parts.  
First, above we have defined the domestic government’s sovereignty over a policy instrument
in   to be directly compromised by an international agreement whenever limits on that policy
instrument are directly negotiated between it and a foreign government.  Clearly the non-
discrimination rule is a negotiated limit on the domestic government’s tariff instruments, of the form
.  However,   includes only the tariff  , not both   and  : given domestic
market access levels determined by  ,   and  , the tariff   is determined by the linkage
condition (18) once   is chosen, and so as we observed in the previous subsection   is not an
independent choice variable once domestic market access levels are given.  The non-discrimination
rule, then, does not restrict  , and so it does not place limits on any policy instrument in  .  Hence,
we may conclude that the domestic government’s sovereignty over its tariff instruments is not
directly compromised when it accepts a non-discrimination rule.  
The remaining question is whether the domestic government’s sovereignty is indirectly
compromised, and this is the focus of the second part of our answer.  To provide an answer, we now
observe using the linkage condition (18) that the MFN rule restricts the feasible Step-2 choices of 
and   to those that satisfy  , but as we noted just above leaves the Step-1 choices of the     
11It is worth emphasizing that this feature extends naturally to a setting with more than two foreign countries.  With
 foreign countries, there are then   linkage conditions analogous to (18), implying that given   and the set of
’ s only one   remains to be determined.     
     
12If all countries are small, then it can be shown that the Multilateral Nash Policy Game yields policy choices that
are efficient from an international perspective, and so there would be no reason for an international agreement to exist
in this case (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, 2001).
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domestic government   unrestricted given its Step-2 choices.  Accordingly, we may
conclude that the domestic government’s sovereignty is not compromised indirectly when it agrees
to abide by the non-discrimination rule.  We may therefore state:
Proposition 7: Abiding by the non-discrimination rule does not compromise national sovereignty.
Proposition 7 reflects the following intuition.  Discriminatory tariffs make possible certain
market access choices that would be impossible under MFN.  But market access (Step-2) choices
lack interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty in the Multilateral Nash Policy
Game.  Therefore, for these choices, the MFN restriction can not take away sovereignty that
governments did not possess in the first place.  And given any market access choices that would be
feasible under MFN, discriminatory tariffs do not create any additional possibilities relative to MFN
tariffs for delivering these market access levels.  This feature is reflected in the fact that the Step-1
choices of Program 3' may be expressed as choices over domestic regulations   and a single tariff
.  Hence, for these decisions, which are the (Step-1) decisions over which governments enjoy
sovereignty in the Multilateral Nash Policy Game, the MFN restriction has no bearing.
11 
Thus far we have maintained an assumption in the three-country model (consistent with our
two-country model) that all countries are “large,” in the sense that each has an impact on world
prices when it alters its policies.  In the next subsection, we consider the possibility that some
countries might be “small,” and so do not alter world prices when they alter their policies.
12
However, before turning to a setting in which some countries are large and some are small, we record
a final result for the world in which all countries are large. 37
In light of Propositions 5 and 7, we may state:
Proposition 8: If all countries are “large,” market access agreements that require governments to
abide by the non-discrimination rule preserve the national sovereignty of each government.  
V.6: The Sovereignty of Small Countries
We now treat foreign country 2 as a foreign region which is composed of a continuum of
identical “small” countries, no one of which individually has any impact on world markets.  We
observe that, in light of the assumed symmetry of countries within region 2, the domestic
government will not discriminate across foreign countries within region 2 in a symmetric Nash
equilibrium (i.e., the domestic government’s best-response tariffs will continue to consist of a tariff 
against imports from foreign country 1 and a tariff   against imports from all foreign countries
residing in region 2).  
It can immediately be seen that Program 3' continues to provide a valid two-step
representation of the domestic government’s best-response choices of  ,   and    given any 
and   imposed by foreign country 1 and any   and   imposed symmetrically by each foreign
country in region 2.  This means in turn that, in the (symmetric) equilibrium of the Multilateral Nash
Policy Game, the domestic government continues to enjoy sovereignty over its Step-1 choices, and
it continues to lack both interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty in its Step-2
choices, when foreign region 2 is interpreted as being composed of many small countries.  An
analogous statement applies to foreign country 1: the government of foreign country 1 continues to
enjoy sovereignty over its Step-1 choices   in the Multilateral Nash Policy Game, and
it continues to lack both interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty in its Step-2
choices  , when foreign region 2 is interpreted as being composed of many small countries.
However, an important difference arises in the Multilateral Nash Policy Game with respect
to the sovereignty enjoyed by the small foreign countries of region 2.  A representative foreign38
government c in region 2, being small, takes the market clearing world price for trade between the
domestic country and region 2,  , as given and fixed at  , where 
and   represent the (symmetric) policy levels of all other small countries in foreign region 2.  As
a general matter, world prices are taken as fixed (at the levels implied by Step-2 choices) in the Step-
1 choice problem, and so the Step-1 choice problem for this representative region-2 government is
not altered from before.  Specifically, letting “c” denote variables associated with a representative
region-2 government, its Step-1 program is:
Step 1. Fix  , and 
s.t. .
But with   denoting the Lagrangean associated with c’s Step-1 program, and with
( ) denoting the choices that solve c’s Step-1 program, the Step-2 choice
problem for this representative region-2 government is now:
Step 2.
s.t. .
Evidently, while the Step-2 choices of the government of a representative small country in
region 2 lack interdependence sovereignty in the extreme – the constraint imposed by the policies
of all other countries now completely dictates the relevant world price   for the government of
country c  – these Step-2 choices now do reflect Westphalian sovereignty: with the government of
country c unable to alter   with its Step-2 choices, all other governments
are indifferent to the outcome of its Step-2 choice problem.  As small countries thus enjoy a degree
of sovereignty in their market access (Step-2) choices in the Multilateral Nash Policy Game, we now
broaden our notion of sovereignty preservation accordingly and observe that the (Westphalian)
sovereignty of a small country is directly compromised when it accepts a market access commitment
as a result of an international negotiation.  We may therefore state:
Proposition 9: The sovereignty of the government of a small country cannot be preserved in an
international agreement in which it is asked to make market access commitments.      
13While Proposition 7 is derived in a setting where all countries are large, in the current setting each small foreign
country trades only with the domestic country, and so an MFN requirement does not apply to small countries,
guaranteeing that the result of Proposition 7 extends to the current setting as well.  Moreover, even if a small country
had multiple trading partners, its inability to affect world prices implies that any attempt by it to set discriminatory tariffs
would simply prohibit trade between it and all but its most-favored (lowest-tariff) trading partner, thereby ensuring that
it has no incentive to deviate from non-discriminatory tariffs in a Nash equilibrium (and that an MFN requirement would
therefore not compromise its sovereignty).  
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To see whether there are circumstances under which the attainment of international efficiency
is nevertheless consistent with the preservation of national sovereignty when small countries are
present, observe now that the best-response policy choices of the representative government c solve
 for  , 
which by (27) corresponds to the politically optimal policy choices for this government.   Hence, if
a small country is not asked to make market access commitments in a trade agreement, it will
implement its politically optimal policies.  Accordingly, by Propositions 6 and 9, international
efficiency can be consistent with preservation of the sovereignty of small countries only if MFN is
imposed.  But by Proposition 7, the MFN rule itself entails no sacrifice of national sovereignty.
13
Referring to politically optimal market access agreements as market access agreements which
achieve the market access levels implied by politically optimal policies, we may now state: 
Proposition 10: If some (but not all) countries are “small,” then achieving international efficiency
and preserving national sovereignty are mutually consistent goals of an international agreement if
and only if the agreement satisfies the MFN requirement.  In particular, politically optimal market
access agreements that require governments to abide by the non-discrimination rule provide the
unique path to achieving international efficiency while preserving national sovereignty in this setting.
In effect, if small countries are asked to make market access commitments, their Westphalian
sovereignty will be compromised, as Proposition 9 reflects.  If this is to be avoided, then small
countries must be left unconstrained to choose their best-response policies in any international
agreement.  This requirement, though, is consistent with international efficiency only when tariffs
also conform to the MFN requirement, as indicated by Proposition 6.  As a consequence, Proposition
10 suggests that a non-discrimination rule is “complementary” to preserving the national sovereignty40
of small countries in the following sense: the (Westphalian) sovereignty of small countries can be
preserved under an internationally efficient agreement only if that agreement abides by the MFN
requirement.  More broadly, and in light of our finding in Proposition 7 that the MFN requirement
itself involves no compromise of national sovereignty, our three-country results therefore suggest
that a non-discrimination rule coupled with a market access agreement can facilitate the attainment
of internationally efficient outcomes which do not compromise national efficiency. 
When viewed together, the results from this and the previous section have potentially
important implications for the design of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The GATT/WTO has from its inception been
concerned most fundamentally with non-discriminatory market access commitments, and it has
traditionally sought to anchor these commitments with negotiations over border measures (e.g.,
tariffs) that are “multilateralized” through the MFN requirement.  But this tradition is being eroded
on two fronts.  First, the extent and importance of discriminatory trade agreements (permitted by
GATT/WTO exceptions to its MFN requirement) has increased dramatically in recent decades.  And
second, increasingly the WTO is thought of as a potential forum for the negotiation of international
commitments on a host of non-border policies that are deemed to have important market access
consequences, ranging from labor standards to environmental regulations to competition policy.  Our
results highlight the fundamental implications of these developments for the potential conflicts
between international efficiency and national sovereignty within the WTO.  Specifically, as our
results indicate, the further the WTO departs from facilitating agreements that take the form of non-
discriminatory market access commitments, the more it is likely to pose a (direct and indirect – and
in principle, unnecessary) threat to the sovereignty of its member governments.  
VI. National Sovereignty and International Institutions 
The essential logic from our analysis thus far boils down to a simple message: identify the
transmission mechanism of the international externality, write international agreements directly over
this transmission mechanism, and you can achieve international efficiency at the cost of a modest
(and possibly zero) sacrifice of national sovereignty.  When the international externalities that create     
14A more systematic exploration of national sovereignty in the case where important international externalities of a
non-pecuniary nature exist must consider how the presence of such externalities would affect the partitions of the
government choice problems that we have exploited in this paper.  We leave this to future work. 
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international inefficiency are of a pecuniary nature, the transmission mechanism takes a specific
form: market access.  What happens, though, when international externalities of a non-pecuniary
nature arise?  Externalities of this nature are the primary focus of the large literature on fiscal
federalism that began with Oates (1972) and is extended to an explicitly international context in the
work of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2003) and others.  In this section,
we briefly explore one facet of the relationship between national sovereignty and international
efficiency when international externalities take a non-pecuniary form.
14 
Specifically, we focus on an important distinction that arises between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary externalities.  Pecuniary externalities give rise to inefficiency only if agents (in this case
governments) wield market power and can therefore affect prices (in this case world prices) with
their actions.  In the case of non-pecuniary externalities, by contrast, inefficiency typically arises
even when all agents are small and there is no market power affecting decisions.  
The importance of this distinction for issues of national sovereignty can be appreciated by
noting that “small” countries by definition enjoy Westphalian sovereignty in all their decisions.  In
the case of international pecuniary externalities, we have seen that small countries enjoy Westphalian
sovereignty in their market access choices of the Multilateral Nash Policy Game, while large
countries do not.  But in a sense, where international pecuniary externalities are involved, it is also
the large countries – not the small – that are creating the international inefficiency.  This suggests
that, in the case of international pecuniary externalities, there is no inherent conflict between
preserving Westphalian sovereignty and achieving international efficiency through an international
agreement, because only the large countries need expand their market access beyond unilaterally
chosen levels to achieve international efficiency, and this requires of them no compromise of
(Westphalian) sovereignty.  This suggestion is formalized in Propositions 10.   42
In the case of international non-pecuniary externalities, however, a group of countries will
typically contribute to the international inefficiency even when each country within that group is
“small” with regard to this externality, and therefore even if each country within that group enjoys
Westphalian sovereignty with respect to decisions that impact the externality.  This suggests that,
in contrast to the case of international pecuniary externalities, when important international non-
pecuniary externalities are present, governments may face an inescapable tradeoff between
international efficiency and (Westphalian) sovereignty.  This tradeoff is illustrated most starkly in
a hypothetical case where all countries are small in the dimension of an international non-pecuniary
externality.  In that case, in the absence of an international agreement, all countries enjoy
Westphalian sovereignty in decisions that impact this externality.  Nevertheless, even though all
countries are small, the existence of the international non-pecuniary externality typically creates an
international inefficiency, and the attainment of international efficiency therefore requires that
Westphalian sovereignty over decisions that impact this externality must be sacrificed.  
This discussion suggests that, when it comes to issues of national sovereignty as they arise
in the context of efforts to solve international problems, not all international problems are alike.  In
particular, international problems that reflect inefficiencies that are fundamentally driven by trade
have a particular structure – they concern international pecuniary externalities – which implies the
absence of any inherent conflict between international efficiency and national sovereignty.  By
contrast, confronting international problems that derive from international non-pecuniary
externalities is likely to pose a more direct efficiency/sovereignty tradeoff.
VII. Conclusion
What are the sovereign rights of nations in an interdependent world, and to what extent do
these rights stand in the way of achieving important international objectives?  In this paper, we have
proposed answers to these two questions.  Our answers, of course, depend on the definition of
national sovereignty.  We have formally defined two features of sovereignty – unilateral control and
internal affairs – that we believe are central to the respective notions of interdependence sovereignty
and Westphalian sovereignty emphasized in the political science literature.  And using these43
definitions, we have shown how Nash choice problems can be partitioned in a way that allows a
characterization of the degree and nature of sovereignty that governments possess in the Nash
equilibrium.  This characterization, in turn, provides a benchmark from which to formally assess the
implications for national sovereignty of international agreements of various designs.  In regard to this
assessment, we report two broad findings.  
First, in the context of international commercial relations, we find that in principle there is
no inherent conflict between the twin objectives of attaining international efficiency through
international agreements and preserving national sovereignty.  And we find that a number of the
foundational aspects of the GATT/WTO, such as its emphasis on market access commitments and
the MFN rule, are in harmony with these twin objectives.  In this regard, we give formal support to
the observation of Rabkin (1998):
“Probably the single most effective and consequential international program of the postwar era has been the mutual
reduction of trade barriers under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, initiated in 1947.  Reasonable questions
may be raised about certain aspects of the World Trade Organization, established in 1995 to help administer GATT
norms.  But, fundamentally, the trading system is quite compatible with traditional notions of sovereignty.  It was
developed on the foundations of much older sorts of international agreement, which would have been quite recognizable
to the Framers of the Constitution.” Rabkin, pp. 85-86.
However, our results also suggest that the maintenance of this compatibility depends crucially on
being true to these fundamental principles: the further away the WTO moves from a market-access
focus and adherence to MFN, the more likely will conflicts arise within the WTO between
international efficiency and national sovereignty.
Our second broad finding is that, in the universe of international relations among national
governments, commercial relations are special, because trade problems that warrant international
attention reflect international externalities of a pecuniary nature.  Pecuniary externalities give rise
to a distinctive structure that, as we have demonstrated, suggests a natural harmony between national
sovereignty and international efficiency.  In contrast, to the extent that governments are
interdependent as a result of non-pecuniary externalities, we suggest that the conflicts between
international efficiency and national sovereignty may be inescapable.44
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide proofs of all lemmas and propositions that are not proved in
the body of the paper. 
Lemma 1: Program 1 and Program 1' are equivalent ways of characterizing the domestic
government’s best-response policies for any   and  .
Proof: We prove this by establishing that the first-order conditions associated with Program 1', (13)-
(16), are equivalent to the first-order conditions associated with Program 1, (5)-(6).  To establish this,
we first use (3) to derive
.
With this expression, and using (15) and (16) to eliminate   from (14) , it is then direct to verify that
(6) and (14) are equivalent.  Similarly, we use (3) to derive 
   for  .
With this expression,  and using (15) and (16) to eliminate   from (13), it is then direct to verify that
(5) and (13) are equivalent. QED
Proposition 6: Politically optimal tariffs and regulations are efficient if and only if the tariffs
conform to MFN.  Moreover, if any country sets its politically optimal policies, then efficiency
requires that all countries set their politically optimal policies and abide by MFN. 
Proof: To prove this proposition, we first characterize the efficiency frontier of the 3-country model.
To this end, fix foreign welfare levels   for   and define   implicitly by
  for  .
Observe that 46
(A1) ; and  ,
for   and  .  We may now define 
,
and observe that, by the market-clearing condition (21), a value of   is implied, which we denote
by  .  We may thus write domestic government welfare as a function of the
domestic regulatory choices, the foreign regulatory choices and foreign tariffs, and the foreign
welfare levels, or 
(A2) .  
Fixing foreign welfare levels and choosing domestic and foreign regulations and foreign tariffs to
maximize domestic welfare given by (A2) then defines a point on the efficiency frontier.  The first
order conditions that define the efficiency frontier are 
(A3)   for  ,
(A4)   for   and  , and 
(A5)   for  .  
By (27) and (A3)-(A5), politically optimal tariffs and regulations are efficient if and only if 
(A6)  for    and  .
But by (A1), (A6) is satisfied at the political optimum if and only if
(A7)   for    and  .
Hence, by (A7), politically optimal tariffs and regulations are efficient if and only if the tariffs47
conform to MFN (so that   for  ).  Further, if any country’s policies are set at their
politically optimal levels, then (A1)-(A7) can be used to show that efficiency requires that all
countries set their politically optimal policies and abide by MFN.    QED
Lemma 3: Program 3 and Program 3' are equivalent ways of characterizing the domestic
government’s best-response policies for any  ,  ,   and  .
Proof: We prove this by establishing that the first-order conditions associated with Program 3', (30)-
(32), are equivalent to the first-order conditions associated with Program 3, (23)-(26).  To this end,
we first use (30) and (32) to derive an expression for  , which allows (29) to be written as 
(A8) .
Next, we observe that (24) implies  , which can be manipulated to yield
(A9) ,
which in turn allows   to be written as 
(A10) .
Using the linkage condition (18) and the market-clearing condition (21), expressions for 
and   may be derived which, when substituted into (A10), yield
(A11) .
Therefore, by substituting (A11) into (24) and observing that the resulting expression is identical to
(A8), we may conclude that (30), (32) and (29) imply (24).  Similarly, we use (30) and (31) to derive
an alternative expression for  , which allows (28) to be written as
(A12) .48
Now using (18) and (21), we may derive that 
(A13) .
Substituting (A13) into (A12) yields an expression identical to (23).  Hence, we may conclude that
(30), (31) and (28) imply (23).    QED